Embedded HW/SW Platform for On-the-Fly Testing of True Random Number Generators by yang, Bohan et al.
Embedded HW/SW Platform for On-the-Fly Testing
of True Random Number Generators
Bohan Yang∗, Vladimir Rozˇic´∗, Nele Mentens∗, Wim Dehaene† and Ingrid Verbauwhede∗
∗ ESAT/COSIC and iMinds, KU Leuven,
† ESAT/MICAS, KU Leuven and IMEC,
Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, B-3001 Leuven-Heverlee, Belgium
Email:{bohan.yang, vladimir.rozic, nele.mentens, wim.dehaene, ingrid.verbauwhede}@esat.kuleuven.be
Abstract—We present a HW/SW platform for on-the-fly detec-
tion of failures and weaknesses in entropy sources. By splitting the
operations between hardware and software, we achieve sufficient
flexibility to control the level of significance of the tests. This
approach also enables sharing resources between different tests
thereby reducing the area and power. Statistical tests were
selected from the NIST test suite. We propose several versions
of hardware co-processors for monitoring random bit sequences,
ranging from 52 slices (5 tests) to 552 slices (9 tests) on Spartan-6
FPGA. We are the first to provide implementations of the Serial
test and the Approximate entropy test for on-the-fly monitoring.
I. INTRODUCTION
Random numbers are used in cryptography for generat-
ing session keys, nonces, and random challenges in various
authentication protocols. These numbers are generated using
specialized primitives called true random number generators
(TRNGs) which produce unpredictable, uniformly distributed
output values.
BSI’s standard AIS-31 [1] for TRNG evaluation, requires
on-the-fly tests of all TRNGs implemented in hardware. The
purpose of these tests is to detect failures or statistical
weaknesses of the entropy source. The draft of the special
publication by NIST [2], also requires on-the-fly tests (health
tests) for random number generators.
A. Previous Work
Several batteries of tests for statistical evaluation of
TRNGs are available, such as FIPS [3], [4], NIST [5] and
DIEHARD [6]. Some of these tests have been implemented
in hardware. Hardware implementations of 4 FIPS tests are
proposed in [7], [8]. Implementations of 2 simple tests from
NIST and 4 from DIEHARD suites are presented in [9]
and [10]. In [11], an FPGA implementation based on dynamic
reconfiguration was provided. However, the architecture of
this design was not suitable for on-the-fly testing. Partially
reconfigurable ASIC implementations of 6 NIST tests are
presented in [12]. FPGA implementations of 8 different tests
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from the NIST test suite are presented in [13]. Each test was
implemented individually and none of the hardware resources
were shared.
As pointed out in [14], one disadvantage of the embedded
on-the-fly tests is the possible effect of the tests on the TRNG
behavior. Embedded tests increase the chip activity resulting
in more digital noise, which may affect the TRNG in such
way to pass the statistical tests. However, if the TRNG is
used when tests are not active, less (deterministic) noise is
present on the chip. One way to resolve this situation is keeping
the tests active all the time while the TRNG is in operation,
thereby ensuring that the TRNG always operates under the
same conditions for which it was tested. Another disadvantage
is vulnerability to fault attacks. In all previous implementations,
the embedded tests generate an alarm signal in case of a threat
detection. If this signal is connected to ground (for instance due
to a probing attack), the failure will not be detected. In order
to prevent this type of fault, a different approach is required.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper we present hardware blocks for performing on-
the-fly evaluation of randomness. We provide three different
versions that operate on bit sequences of different lengths. The
random sequence is read bit by bit. The tests were selected
from the NIST battery of tests. This test suite is not designed
for on-the-fly testing and in general, it is not suitable for
this purpose due to the high latency and high computational
requirements. However, some of these tests can be optimized
for compact hardware implementation and low latency. We
have selected those tests from the suite that can be optimized
for compact implementation in order to make them suitable
for on-the-fly monitoring.
Our first contribution is splitting the calculations between
hardware and software in order to enable efficient sharing of
resources between different tests in order to minimize the
required hardware area. Each test is carried out using two
types of operations. The first type consists of operations on
the incoming bits such as: counting ones and zeros, finding
the maximal longest run of the same value, counting the
appearance of a given pattern or keeping track of a random
walk. These operations are implemented in hardware using
counters, comparators and registers, and they are performed
while the TRNG is active.
The second type of operations is used for verifying the
randomness hypothesis. These operations, which include addi-
TABLE I: The NIST test suite. Some tests are suitable for HW
implementation.
TEST HW
1.The Frequency (Monobit) Test Yes
2.Frequency Test within a Block Yes
3.The Runs Test Yes
4.Test for Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block Yes
5.The Binary Matrix Rank Test No
6.The Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test No
7.The Non-overlapping Template Matching Test Yes
8.The Overlapping Template Matching Test Yes
9.Maurer’s ”Universal Statistical” Test No
10.The Linear Complexity Test No
11.The Serial Test Yes
12.The Approximate Entropy Test Yes
13.The Cumulative Sums (Cusums) Test Yes
14.The Random Excursions Test No
15.The Random Excursions Variant Test No
tion, multiplication, squaring and comparison, are performed
on the obtained counters values after the sequence have been
generated. These operations are only required once in a while,
therefore it makes sense to reduce the datapath area at the price
of increased latency, for example by sharing the multiplier
between different tests. Moreover, since these operations are
very common (multiplication, addition, comparison) most mi-
crocontrollers and soft-core processors already have dedicated
instructions for these operations. Our assumption is that the
TRNG and tests operate in an embedded system which also
contains a microcontroller or a simple processor for performing
basic arithmetic operations. It is also assumed that part of the
cycle budget can be used for the randomness testing since this
procedure is not required very often and doesn’t take many
cycles to perform. For this reason, operations for verifying
the randomness hypothesis, are moved to the software. This
is somewhat different from the standard approach where the
hardware blocks complete the full test and report the failure
by activating the alarm signal. Our approach assumes that the
microcontroller reads the counter values from the hardware
blocks and performs the remaining operations. This approach
makes probing attacks difficult because there is no single alarm
signal, but rather a set of numerical values that are being
transmitted.
Another advantage of HW/SW co-design is flexibility. Each
test can be carried out with a critical value 𝛼 of level of
significance, where the recommendations by NIST are that 𝛼 is
chosen from the interval [0.001, 0.01]. The presented hardware
blocks analyze the generated sequence and provide the results
that do not depend on 𝛼. Level of significance only figures in
the operations performed by the software which can be easily
programmed.
Our second contribution is the implementation of the serial
test and the approximate entropy test from the NIST test suite.
To the best of our knowledge, these are the first hardware
implementations of these tests suitable for on-the-fly testing.
Our third contribution is the unified implementation of
hardware blocks, which allows for different tests to share
resources such as bit counters. In addition, different tests
use the same counter values (for example, number of ones
in a sequence) so there is no need for these counters to be
duplicated.
Fig. 1: Testing environment
C. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide
the general background and notation. Section 3, deals with the
implementation aspects including the numerical simplifications,
splitting the operations between the hardware and software
as well as the implementation of the hardware blocks. The
results of the FPGA and ASIC implementations, as well as
comparison with relevant work are presented in Section 4.
Finally, conclusions and proposals for future work are provided
in Section 5.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statistical Tests
Even though randomness is a property of a variable, rather
than a sequence of numbers, and therefore cannot be measured
like other physical quantities, it is possible to estimate the
randomness by checking different statistical properties. The
idea behind statistical tests is to start with the hypothesis that
the RNG is ideal, we will denote this hypothesis as 𝐻0. A
statistical test is used to measure a property of the generated
sequence, for example the longest run of zeros. Based on the
test result, the hypothesis 𝐻0 is either accepted or rejected. If
the sequence is indeed random, it is still possible to reject
𝐻0 with some small probability. This is known as a type
1 error. The probability of this error is a design parameter
called the level of significance and denoted as 𝛼. The NIST
recommendation for the value of 𝛼 is between 0.001 and 0.01.
The other type of error that can occur is accepting 𝐻0 when
the sequence is not random. This is known as a type 2 error,
and the purpose of the test is to minimize the probability
of this error. The generated sequence should be tested for
many different statistical weaknesses in order to accept it as
random. As summed up in table I, The NIST suite consists
of 15 statistical tests which estimate different properties of a
random variable. These tests are originally designed to evaluate
the statistical properties of pseudo-random number generators
(PRNGs), but they are also used for evaluation of TRNGs.
Hardware implementations of these tests can be used for on-
the-fly monitoring.
B. On-the-fly Tests
Hardware implementations of TRNGs are susceptible to
different active attacks. It is possible to reduce the randomness
by changing the operating conditions, such as temperature or
TABLE II: Calculations split between hardware and software.
Test Hardware Software
Frequency Monobit Test 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠 Comparison operations
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𝑁∑
𝑖=0
(𝜀𝑖 −
𝑀
2
)
2
Runs Test 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠, 𝑁𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠 Comparison operations
Longest Run of Ones in a Block 𝜈𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠,1, 𝜈𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠,2...𝜈𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠,𝑁
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Serial Test 𝜈0000, 𝜈0001, ...𝜈1111,
𝜈000, 𝜈001, 𝜈010...𝜈111,
𝜈00, 𝜈01, 𝜈10, 𝜈11
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Approximate Entropy Test 𝜈0000, 𝜈0001, ...𝜈1111,
𝜈000, 𝜈001, 𝜈010...𝜈111
∑
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𝑙𝑜𝑔
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Cumulative Sums Test 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑆𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑆𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙−𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑆𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙) Com-
parison operations
voltage. Paper [15] demonstrates that manipulating the power
supply can cause ring oscillators inside a TRNG to lock to
a certain frequency, thereby reducing the generated entropy.
A similar attack can be done using an electromagnetic probe
as shown in [16]. The trivial way for completely disabling
the source of randomness is by cutting the signal wire used
for transmitting random bits. In addition to active attacks, a
designer needs to worry about failures due to aging. For this
reason, different tests are required for on-the-fly monitoring of
RNGs: quick tests for fast detection of the total failure of the
entropy source, as well as slow tests for the detection of long
term statistical weaknesses.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
A. System Design
In embedded systems, random number generators are never
used as a stand-alone module, but rather in conjunction with
the other components such as embedded processors, microcon-
trollers or DSPs. For this reason, we can assume that the chip
containing an RNG and the HW testing block, also contains a
component that can perform basic arithmetic operations. This
component can serve as the software platform.
As depicted in Fig. 1, the embedded system consists of a
TRNG, the HW Testing Block, at least one component that
performs arithmetic (microcontroller, DSP or a GPU), and
possibly other components such as embedded RAM and crypto
co-processors. We split the testing implementation into two
parts: hardware and software. To reduce the area and power
consumption of the HW testing block, it is implemented in
a compact manner using only the basic components such as
counters, comparators and registers, while all power-hungry
arithmetic operations are moved to the software part. Squaring,
multiplication, logarithm and comparison with the precom-
puted constants are performed in software.
The proposed approach allows for a flexibility with respect
to the level of significance 𝛼. Since the implementation of the
hardware block doesn’t depend on 𝛼, the software part can be
updated in case this value needs to be changed. As pointed out
in [14], on-the-fly tests should be active while the TRNG is
working in order to ensure that they are always operating in the
same conditions as when they are being tested. The proposed
approach allows us to run the hardware block all the time and
check the test results only when needed.
B. HW/SW Calculations
All calculations needed for the statistical tests, are divided
between a HW testing block and software executed on the SW
platform (micro-controller or any processor with instructions
for basic arithmetic). The boundary between hardware and
software is chosen to minimize the hardware block, i.e. to
keep only the necessary parts in hardware. Each test consists
of operations that have to be executed while the bit stream is
generated (the HW part) and basic arithmetic operations (SW
part). It is also important to minimize the amount of data that
needs to be transferred from HW to a co-processor in order to
simplify the interface between the two modules.
We have selected 9 tests from the NIST test suite which
are suitable for this type of implementation, as indicated in
table I. The remaining 6 tests either require too much data
storage in the HW module which would result in large area,
too complex operations in the software part which would result
in high latency, or too much data to be transferred between
the two modules which would result in an overly complicated
interface.
Table II presents how the required operations were divided
between HW and SW. The middle column (Hardware), lists
all the values that are computed by the HW module and
transferred to the co-processor. We used the following notation:
∙ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠 - the total number of ones.
Fig. 2: Hardware module containing all tests
∙ 𝑁𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠 - the total number of runs in a sequence. A
single run is a consecutive appearance of a single value
(0 or 1).
∙ 𝜀𝑖 - number of ones within a block of data.
∙ 𝑀 - length of a single block of data.
∙ 𝑁 - number of data blocks.
∙ 𝜈𝑖 - number of runs within a block of data.
∙ 𝑊𝑖 - number of non-overlapping appearances of a
given template within a block of data.
∙ 𝜈𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝,𝑖 - the number of data blocks in each category
depending on the number of overlapping appearances
of a given template.
∙ 𝑚 - length of a template.
∙ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥, 𝑆𝑚𝑖𝑛, 𝑆𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 - partial sums obtained by the
up/down counter. Maximal, minimal (negative) and the
final value are recorded.
All other values are test-specific precomputed constants.
Software routines operate on these obtained data values.
As can be seen from the last column of table II, required
operations for software are basic multiplication, addition and
comparison operations. The only difficulty is implementing
the 𝑥⋅ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥) function needed for the approximate entropy test,
which will be described in more detail in subsection III-D.
C. HW Implementations
We have implemented several versions of the HW testing
block. Fig. 2 shows the implementation of the largest version
that contains all 9 tests and operates on a sequence of 220
bits. Clock and enable signals are omitted for better clarity.
The global bit counter is also not shown. This counter is used
to count the total number of bits in order to detect the end
of the sequence. A memory-mapped interface is implemented
using a large multiplexer, where the 7-bit address is used as
a select signal. Since this interface contributes significantly to
the overall area we can save resources by reducing the number
of transmitted values.
After receiving each random bit from the generator, all
update calculations finish within one clock cycle.
This type of unified implementation enables us to share
more resources between different tests to obtain higher area
reduction. We have used 4 tricks to reduce the area of this
module:
∙ Omitting a redundant counter: Tests 1 and 3 use
the total number of 1’s in a sequence to compute
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Fig. 3: PWL approximation of the function 𝑥 ⋅ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥)
the test result. However, it is possible to obtain this
result without this counter. For the implementation of
test 13, an up/down counter is used to keep track of
the random walk. The total number of ones can be
calculated from the final value of this counter. For
this reason, the counter of ones can be omitted.
∙ Block detection: For the implementations of tests
2, 4, 7 and 8 it is necessary to divide the sequence
into sub-blocks and look for certain properties in
each block (the total number of ones, longest run
of the same bit value, and occurrences of different
patterns). We have selected test parameters such that
block lengths are equal to powers of 2, which enables
us to detect the beginning and the end of each block by
simply observing specific bits of the global bit counter.
∙ Unified implementation: The approximate entropy
test (test 12) uses the number of all 4-bit and 3-bit pat-
terns in a sequence. These values are already provided
by the serial test (test 11) implementation, therefore
there is no need for the separate implementation of
test 12.
∙ Shared shift register: The non-overlapping and
the overlapping template match tests compare the
generated numbers with the pre-defined 9-bit patterns.
The same shift register can be used for both tests.
D. SW Implementations
Typical software implementations of statistical tests operate
by computing the P-value, and comparing it with the required
level of significance. P-value is the probability that an ideal
random number generator produces a sequence which is worse
than the measured sequence with respect to the metric used
by the test (for example bias, or the longest run of the same
bit value). This is a computationally intensive task because
calculating P-values requires complicated functions such as
erfc and the gamma function. We use a simple approach
of computing the inverse functions of the critical value and
storing the precomputed constants, thereby skipping the most
computationally intensive step. This approach is also used in
[9], [13], [12].
As shown in table II, implementations of tests 1 and 3
only require comparison operations. Test 1 only compares the
TABLE III: Implementation results
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test1 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙
test2 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙
test3 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙
test4 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙
test7 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙
test8 ∙ ∙
test11 ∙ ∙ ∙
test12 ∙ ∙ ∙
test13 ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙
FPGA:
Slice 520.8%
149
2.2%
144
2.1%
168
2.5%
377
5.5%
173
2.5%
291
4.3%
552
8.1%
FF 110 329 307 375 836 379 585 1156
LUTs 158 471 420 454 1103 546 828 1699
MaxFreq 156 147 143 136 133 125 122 121
(MHz)
ASIC:
GE 1210 3632 3243 3850 8983 4013 5993 12416
SW: 16-bit instructions
ADD 9 153 108 122 266 130 358 890
SUB 8 14 16 24 30 24 40 50
MUL 4 28 24 24 48 15 47 91
SQR 8 36 14 22 50 23 45 101
SHIFT 0 3 0 8 11 0 8 11
COMP 22 28 42 44 50 34 42 48
LUT 0 24 0 0 24 0 0 24
READ 10 24 18 22 50 21 35 91
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠 with the critical value. For test 3, the critical values for
the 𝑁𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠 are stored in the program memory as constants and
they depend on the 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠. The SW procedure first checks the
interval where 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠 belong and based on the result, compares
𝑁𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠 with the appropriate constant. Similar approach was
used for FPGA implementation in [13].
Other tests require simple calculations on the obtained
values before the comparison. Required operations are compar-
ison, addition (subtraction), multiplication and squaring. Typ-
ical processor has dedicated instructions for these operations.
The main difficulty is related to the implementation of The
Approximate Entropy Test, which required the implementation
of the function 𝑥 ⋅ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑥). In order to avoid computationally
intensive logarithm calculation, we implemented this function
using piece-wise linear approximations with 32 segments. As
can be seen on Fig. 3, the approximation (dash line) is almost
indistinguishable from the function (full line) resulting in less
than 3% error.
IV. RESULTS
We made 8 different designs which covered 9 tests from
the NIST test suite. We implement our hardware designs in
Verilog HDL and use Mentor Graphics Modelsim SE PLUS
6.6d for functional simulation. All proposed hardware designs
are synthesized using Xilinx ISE14.7 on Spartan-6 XC6SLX45
FPGA and Synopsys Design Compiler D-2010.03-SP4 to
UMC’s 0.13𝜇𝑚.1P8M Low Leakage Standard cell Library
with typical values (voltage of 1.2𝑉 and temperature of 25 ∘C).
As with most practical implementations, there is no golden
way to the perfect system in a generic way, and different
applications demand different design trade-offs. As shown
in table III, we propose 8 different implementations which
support three different input lengths 128/65536/1048576 bits.
TABLE IV: Comparison
[13] This work
Sequence length
test1 20000 65536
test2 20000 65536
test3 20000 65536
test4 128 65536
test7 2048 65536
test13 20000 65536
Slices 256 168
Latency 21 4909
For hardware design, with the merit of a compact hardware
footprint, the 128-bit version can be utilized for lightweight
designs for up to seven different tests. On the other hand, the
1048576-bit version has the capability to support long term
evaluation and up to nine different tests. The 65536-bit version
provides a balanced trade-off between the hardware area and
the input length of the random sequence. All our implemen-
tations on FPGA have a maximum working frequency larger
than 100𝑀𝐻𝑧, in other words, they can handle an input bit
rate of 100𝑀𝑏𝑖𝑡/𝑠, which is enough for most of the TRNGs
on FPGA.
Our designs are also suitable for ASIC, either as an
individual unit or as a building block for processors. In table III
we provide the area results in GE (gate equivalence).
Our software designs can be implemented on different
hardware platforms, such as microcontroller, GPU and DSP.
These embedded systems might utilize different dedicated
peripherals, such as a HW multiplier and squarer. The number
of required clock cycles is greatly dependent on the SW
platform. In table III, We present the instruction count of
software implementations for a 16-bit architecture. We can
see that the largest version requires more than 900 ADD/SUB
and almost 200 MUL/SQR. The reason is that instructions
operating on data larger than 16-bit have to be decomposed
into several 16-bit operations. We can expect that, on 32-bit or
64-bit platforms, considerably lower latency could be achieved.
Since this is the first unified FPGA implementation of the
embedded tests, it is difficult to compare with previously pub-
lished work. In [13], individual implementations of different
tests are presented. These tests are operating on sequences of
different lengths, as shown in table IV. By comparing the total
number of occupied slices of the individual tests from [13] with
our unified implementation for a sequence length of 65536
bits, we can see that our implementation uses around 20%
less slices. However, the comparison is not entirely fair for
two reasons: one, because we use a longer bit sequence, and
two, because some of the functionality is moved to software.
In order to compare the latency, we utilize openMSP430 [17]
as the hardware platform to evaluate our design. As expected,
the latency of the software routine is higher than the latency
of the slowest test from [13] but still much lower than the time
needed to generate the sequence.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a unified implementation
of different NIST tests based on splitting the operations
between hardware and software. By keeping only the necessary
operations in hardware, we have achieved our goal of a low
area cost of the hardware part and a sufficient flexibility for
the software part.
There are several topics to explore as part of the future
work. One topic is modifying the hardware blocks to allow
for more flexibility, for example by allowing the software
to select the length of the test sequence, as well as the test
parameters. Another topic for future research is implementing
the remaining tests from the NIST test suite as well as testing
the software implementations on different types of micro-
controllers and open-core processors.
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